

28 October 1957

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REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE, WARNING SYSTEMS SURVEY COMMITTEE
(Approved by the IAC, 14 May 1957) In its original form

A. NAME:

Warning Systems Survey Committee

B. MISSION:

To determine how fully and promptly present and potential intelligence collection methods, sources and transmission channels can provide information which may be essential for advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.

C. JUSTIFICATION:

1. The requirements in DCID 1/2, Para. E-1: "Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by US agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission."
2. The recommendation in IAC-D 57/14, 7 September 1955, the Post Mortem on NIE 11-6-55, that the Watch Committee contribute evaluations of its operational capabilities whenever estimates of probable intelligence warning are under consideration.

D. FUNCTIONS:

1. The Committee will carry out, under the direction of the IAC and based on information furnished by each IAC agency, a systematic survey of present and potential US intelligence systems which may be capable of providing information on which advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action may be based.
2. The Committee will prepare and forward to IAC agencies lists of questions based on the criteria as set forth in Section E as appropriate. These questions will be directed toward determining the capabilities of the agencies to provide warning information bearing on appropriate indicators of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action. A comprehensive general list of such indicators has been developed by the NIC and will be submitted to the agencies for review and to the IAC for approval in the course of the survey.
3. Each IAC agency will utilize the questions, criteria, and the general list of indicators in determining its capabilities to provide essential advance warning information. Provision will be made for discussion between members of the Committee and appropriate members of IAC agencies regarding any additional points which may be suggested by agency replies to the Committee's lists of questions.

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4. The Committee, during the course of the survey, will not concern itself with details of operations, identities of sources or sensitive operational techniques of source systems utilized by IAC agencies.

5. As agreed by USCIB at its meeting on 9 August 1957, the Warning Systems Survey Committee will include sources under USCIB cognizance in its survey. As appropriate, specialists in those sources may serve on the Committee and provide technical support in order to assist in the conduct of that portion of the survey.

6. The Committee will prepare a final report based on replies from and discussions with IAC agencies which will comprise an analysis of the capability of the US intelligence community to provide adequate warning information on a timely basis. Recommendations will be made for improving the warning capability where appropriate. The final report will be forwarded to the IAC and to the Wach Committee of the IAC. The Committee will submit quarterly progress reports to the IAC during the course of the survey.

7. The Committee will consider itself dismissed when the IAC has taken action on its final report.

E. CRITERIA:

1. The survey will cover certain general criteria as to the capabilities and vulnerabilities of various types of sources both at present and under anticipated emergency conditions during periods of high international tension and prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It is recognized that the criteria applied will vary among the types of sources under review. Criteria to be employed will include:

a. With relation to the capabilities of a given source:

- (1) Its ability to cover targets of warning significance.
- (2) Policy or other limitations on its employment.
- (3) The present trend in this ability.
- (4) Its potential for developmental breakthroughs in coverage capabilities.
- (5) Its potential for expansion of coverage under alert conditions.
- (6) Threats to its use or effectiveness under emergency or prehostilities conditions.

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- (7) Its vulnerability to deception, manipulation or doubling back.
- (8) Availability of alternative sources or methods which could provide similar coverage in event of its loss.
- (9) Its susceptibility to rapid reassignment to other targets under emergency conditions.

b. With relation to the capabilities for the rapid and timely transmission of information from a given source:

- (1) Past performance under emergency conditions in terms of timeliness, productivity, etc.
- (2) Reporting time factors under normal and under alert conditions from field back to Washington analysis organizations.
- (3) Vulnerability of transmission channels to saturation with high volumes under alert conditions.
- (4) Availability of alternative standby, auxiliary or duplicate transmission channels in emergencies.

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